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In this paper, we examine the causes of the first merger boom since the late 
1990s in Japan. Using industry-level data, we show that mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) are driven mainly by economic shocks. While industries 
with higher growth opportunities are likely to have more M&A activity, 
industries facing negative fundamental shocks, such as rapid sales declines, also 
experience larger M&A deals. These results suggest that the recent merger wave 
in Japan is mainly explained by the neoclassical model. At the firm level, we 
find that the bidder is the firm with the higher growth opportunity, and the target 
is the one with the lower growth opportunity. This means that Japanese firms 
improved their efficiency through merger activity since the 1990s. Lastly, we 
find that internal funds for the acquiring firm play a very important role in 
bidding activity, while a high probability of being targeted for M&A is 
associated with high leverage.   
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1.  Introduction 
      
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) between Japanese corporations began to 
increase rapidly during the late 1990s. The pace of merger activity in Japan, 
which had been hovering at around 500 transactions a year in the 1990s, began to 
pick up from around the end of that decade to reach an annual volume of 2,725 
transactions in 2005. This represented a five-fold increase in M&A transactions 
over a 10-year period (Figure 1). The value of the transactions totaled $25.3 
billion between 1991 and 1997, and $138.1 billion between 1998 and 2005. 
Hence, the value of M&A transactions also experienced a five-fold increase 
during this period.
1 
For most of the postwar era, Japanese firms rarely resorted to mergers and 
acquisitions as a growth strategy or as a means of corporate restructuring. In 
contrast, M&A activity in the form of deals between domestic corporations and 
foreign takeovers of Japanese firms surged since the late 1990s. Moreover, the 
merger activity did not affect all sectors evenly, but tended to cluster in the 
following sectors: paper and pulp, oil refining and other materials industries, 
finance, telecommunications and information, and distribution. The main purpose 
of this paper is to analyze the key factors contributing to the Japanese M&A wave 
that began in the late 1990s. 
Research into the causes of M&A waves has made strides in the U.S., which 
has experienced five such waves since the late 1890s. The key forces behind these 
waves can be divided into two categories: 1) real-economy (neo-classical) forces; 
and 2) financial forces.
2 
Real-economy forces exert both positive and negative shocks on productivity 
and profitability. Examples of forces that have been identified as triggering M&A 
                                                   
1 The figures for total volume of transactions are from RECOF data, and the figures for 
the total value of the transactions are from Jackson and Miyajima (2007). Current data 
is from Thomson Financial.   
2  A predominant view of the causes of such waves has yet to take root. Brealey, Myers 
and Allen(2006) cite M&A waves as one of the 10 puzzles of finance theory.     3
activity through their positive effects on the economy include technical advances 
that facilitate economies of scale and scope and deregulatory measures that 
encourage entry into more profitable sectors. Other scholars such as Jensen 
(1993) put an emphasis on real-economy forces that create negative shocks to the 
economy. These include surges in the cost of primary goods due to political 
uncertainty, the rising cost of raw materials due to the reorganization of upstream 
or downstream industries, the rapid decline in demand due to catch-up 
development by developing countries, and other shocks that force marginal 
corporations in certain industries into the red.
3 Mergers and acquisitions are an 
effective means of reallocating resources, when real-economy shocks give rise to 
excess productive capacity.   
Representative examples of financial forces that promote M&A activity are 
the volume of funds available for acquiring firms and the stock price of the 
acquiring firms. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) hypothesize that when increased cash 
flow leads to rising stock prices, the financial constraint on the acquiring firm is 
relaxed. As a result, as the offered price to the target firm goes up, so does the 
supply of target firms to the M&A market. Empirically, it is clear that the increase 
of M&A activity in the U.S. from the second half of the 1990s was fueled by the 
increase in capital liquidity as indicated by the decline in the interest rate spread 
(Harford, 2005).   
As for the relationship between stock price and mergers, it has been pointed 
out that all five waves of merger activity have occurred during booms in the stock 
market (Golbe and White, 1988). Theoretically, an M&A boom induced by a rise 
in the stock market leads to both positive and negative welfare effects. If the 
stock market is efficient and accurately evaluates the high growth potential of a 
particular industry or firm, rising stock prices make it easier to raise funds for 
M&A activity. This promotes M&A in that industry and contributes to a more 
efficient allocation of resources in the economy as a whole. However, when the 
stock market overvalues the stock of a firm in a particular industry for one reason 
                                                   
3  They are frequently the non-core enterprises of diversified corporations.     4
or another (in comparison to its fundamental value), the welfare effect of the 
stock market boom on the M&A boom will vary.
4 For example, suppose that the 
stock market has overvalued firms in the information-technology industry, which 
has been experiencing rapid technical innovation.
5  Managers who know that their 
own firm’s stock is overvalued have a strong incentive to carry out mergers and 
acquisitions using their own firm’s stock to pay for assets from other firms. This 
perspective was put forth as a way to explain the late-1990s M&A wave in the U.S. 
that was characterized by friendly takeovers and stock swaps. Of course, the 
Japanese stock market had been in a slump in the late 1990s, so the problems of 
bias caused by overvalued stock prices would not have been important. However, 
even if the market as a whole is not in the midst of a boom, soaring stock prices in 
a certain sector, as was the case during the IT bubble, could prompt a merger 
boom. 
The first aim of this paper is to analyze whether the M&A boom in the late 
1990s, the first such boom in Japan in the postwar era, can be explained by 
real-economy (neoclassical) forces and financial forces.   
The second aim of this paper is to identify the key characteristics of acquiring 
firms and target firms. Various factors can be considered worthy of consideration, 
such as the scale of a firm and the level of competition within the industry. A 
specific focus here will be the question of whether firms with high growth 
opportunity can improve their efficiency by taking over firms with diminished 
growth opportunity. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) assert that mergers and 
acquisitions are a form of investment undertaken by firms that can be explained 
by Tobin’s q.
6  In other words, a higher Tobin’s q, which is the ratio of firm value 
to asset reacquisition costs, indicates a greater potential for M&A. If this 
relationship can be confirmed, by stipulating that a highly profitable firm with a 
                                                   
4  Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004).   
5 The case that is frequently cited is the purchase by America Online (AOL) of 
Time-Warner. AOL’s stock price plunged from $73.75 prior to announcement of the 
purchase to $27.28.   
6  Andrade and Stafford (2004) also stress that mergers and acquisitions are substitutes 
for investment.     5
high Tobin’s q has a higher level of managerial and operational know-how 
compared to a low-profitability firm with a low Tobin’s q, then M&A probably 
contributed to an improvement in organizational efficiency.   
On the other hand, if a firm in a mature industry attempts a merger despite 
having exhausted its growth opportunity, the risk that the merger will not 
contribute to an improvement in the organizational efficiency is relatively higher. 
Similarly, if firms with low growth potential are more likely to become M&A 
targets, then we can assume that M&A has become an effective tool for corporate 
restructuring in Japan. Furthermore, debt would appear to have a disciplining 
effect on management in the event that firms with higher leverage are more likely 
to become M&A targets. This paper seeks to identify the characteristics of 
acquiring and targeted firms during the M&A boom in Japan since the late 1990s.   
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
institutional factors that greatly influenced mergers and acquisitions since the 
late 1990s. The third section discusses how M&A between domestic firms were 
concentrated in a handful of industries. The fourth section analyzes the 
real-economy and financial factors that contributed to M&A in certain industries. 
Section 5 estimates a decision model for M&A for a particular firm, and asks who 
buys whom. Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Legal Reforms Promoting Mergers & Acquisitions
7 
2.1. The Impact of the Lifting of the Ban on Holding Companies and the Stock 
Transfer System 
The laws for corporate integration and other institutional changes created an 
infrastructure for M&A activity and played an important role in the increase in 
M&A from 1999. Although it is not possible to explain the rapid increase in M&A 
from the late 1990s solely in terms of institutional changes, it cannot be denied 
that legal changes have played a crucial role. Therefore, before conducting a 
                                                   
7  This section draws on Hattori (2004).     6
quantitative analysis of the increase in M&A activity, a simple overview of the 
rapid implementation of a legal framework for M&A will be discussed.   
The first important legal change was the June 1997 revision to the 
Anti-Monopoly Law, which lifted the ban on holding companies. As is well 
known, the 1947 Anti-Monopoly Law prohibited the formation of holding 
companies and restricted corporate organizational choices. Holding companies 
are companies for which the purpose is to hold stock, formulate strategies for 
business groups, coordinate and monitor group companies, and conduct audits 
without engaging in line business activities. Lifting the ban on holding companies 
carried the following benefits: it turned line businesses into joint stock companies, 
made it easier to buy and sell these operations; and allowed an acquirer to reduce 
the cost of rationalizing the merged back-office. 
The ability to transfer the former corporation’s stock at low cost to the newly 
established holding company is essential to a successful corporate integration 
through this organizational approach. This hurdle was cleared in October 1999 
with the introduction of the stock transfer system under an amendment to the 
Commercial Code. This system creates an integrated approach that allows a firm 
to create a parent (holding) company holding 100% of its stock. It also allows the 
parent company to issue shares to the existing shareholders. Stock in the newly 
established parent company would be exchanged for stock in the original company. 
This approach promoted consolidations as multiple corporations exchanged stock 
to jointly come under the umbrella of a newly established parent company (Table 
1).  
== Table 1 about here== 
The holding company system has been used in place of previous merger 
procedures in the financial and manufacturing sectors since 1999. The first major 
merger to take place under the new holding company system was the formation of 
Mizuho Bank from Fuji Bank, Dai-Ichi Bank, and the Industrial Bank of Japan. 
The merger was announced in the summer of 1999, and finalized in April 2001. 
The first case that attracted attention in the manufacturing sector was the   7
formation of Japan Unipac Holding by Nihon Paper Industries and Daishowa 
Paper Manufacturing. In the steel industry, the merger of NKK and Kawasaki 
Steel was the first under the new procedures. After these two companies came 
under the umbrella of the holding company, JFE Holdings, as wholly owned 
subsidiaries in September 2002, their steel and engineering operations then were 
combined to form two separate companies.   
The introduction of the holding company system is believed to have had 
several important implications for the promotion of consolidation. First, since 
only one of the partners in a merger survived as an ongoing concern in the past, 
mergers were often opposed and blocked by target company employees. 
Oftentimes these suffered from lack of motivation after being taken over.
8 Under 
the new holding company system, the targeted corporate entities continue to 
survive as separate corporate entities. Since friction in personnel and 
organizational matters is avoided, a smoother integration of the businesses is 
possible. Second, wage and employment structures between the acquiring firm 
and the targeted firm are not required to be equalized after integration, thus 
making it easier to merge corporations with different organizational structures.   
 
2.2. The Surge in Stock Swaps and Takeovers 
The introduction of the stock swap system also facilitated takeovers. Stock 
swapping is the mandatory exchange of parent-company and subsidiary-company 
shares. This system makes it possible to exclude minority shareholders with a 
special resolution by the shareholders’ meeting of the target company. Whereas 
stock swaps could previously only occur under mergers, they could now be 
employed in takeovers. This had two major implications. It was now possible to:   
buy all the stock from a large number of shareholders, and 2) to pay for the shares 
of a subsidiary company using the shares of the parent company and not cash. As 
                                                   
8 The  tasukigake approach to personnel management requires that the top two posts of 
the new firm (chairman and chief executive officer) be occupied by an official from 
each of the merger parties.     8
seen in Table 1, introducing the stock swap system led to an increase in the use of 
stock swaps, which was particularly striking in 2004 and 2005.   
There are two main features to the stock swap system. First, it can be used to 
turn the listed target firm into a wholly owned subsidiary of the takeover company. 
By excluding the minority shareholders of a subsidiary, the holding company can 
eliminate the duplication of operations among members of its group and 
consolidate the group’s resources, as well as integrate research and development, 
manufacturing, sales, and other functions. Second, it promotes the use of M&A as 
a growth strategy. Since takeover firms can use their own stock to pay for 
takeovers, financially constrained but highly valued firms used stock swaps to 
acquire firms in emerging markets. For example, livedoor led by Horie Takafumi 
(which includes the former Livin’ on the Edge and other companies) conducted 30 
takeovers valued at a total of 50.7 billion yen. Stock swaps were used in 12 cases.   
On the other hand, the introduction of the company divestiture system under 
the revised Commercial Code that took effect in April 2001 lowered hurdles for 
companies trying to sell their division. The corporate divestiture system made it 
easier to dispose of and spin off business operations as separate companies. If the 
shareholders’ meeting passed a special authorizing resolution, a company could 
transfer an internal division to another company and be compensated with the 
stock of the acquiring company. Under this new type of business transfer, 
acquiring companies could be freed from needing to raise funds for the purchase. 
Furthermore, the previous stipulations requiring an audit performed by a 
court-appointed auditor in cases of investment in-kind deals, and the need to 
acquire the consent of creditors were relaxed under the new system. Both of these 
changes made it easier to sell off businesses. The new system made it possible: 1) 
for a division of a company to ally or merge with divisions of other companies 
engaged in the same line of business; 2) to pursue strategic management by 
casting off main lines of business or turning them into subsidiaries to be managed 
by a holding company; and 3) to pursue a strategic business restructuring by 
spinning off certain operations so that they can be sold to other companies within   9
the same group. (Source: RECOF data). In the five years since this system was 
introduced, there have been 208 cases in which corporate realignment was used to 
promote alliances and integration of operations engaged in the same line of 
business but under different companies. (Table 1)   
 
2.3. Building an M&A Infrastructure 
The Industry Revitalization Law of 1999 (Kigyo katsudo kassei-ka ho) is an 
additional piece of legislation that further promoted M&A activity. This law 
provided tax and legal support measures for revitalization projects certified by 
the minister with authority over the project such as: a reduction or exemption 
from the registration and licensing taxes on investment, as well as investments 
and loans from the Japan Policy Investment Bank. The law allowed firms 1) an 
exemption from inspection by an auditor for investment in-kind and post hoc 
incorporation, and 2) the ability to restructure without convening a shareholders’ 
meeting (streamlined restructuring).
9  Furthermore, the certified company was 3) 
given more flexibility in paying for the merger
10   and 4) would receive 
accelerated screening under the Anti-Monopoly Law. It is believed that these 
measures provided room to maneuver and smoothed the way for mergers and 
acquisitions.  
In contrast, Rossi and Volpin (2004) stress the protection of minority 
shareholder rights and accounting practices as key institutional factors that 
determine the frequency of M&A activity across countries. While there were no 
major changes to the legal framework protecting minority shareholders’ rights in 
the late 1990s, there were substantial changes in accounting standards. The level 
                                                   
9 Under the new law, restructuring was possible without sanctioning a shareholders’ 
meeting and simply by a vote of the board of directors if the target company was only 
one-fifth the size of the bidder, or if the certified company held two-thirds or more of 
the voting rights of the subsidiary.   
10 During reorganization, a company would be permitted to refrain from issuing stock 
in its own company, instead offering “cash” or stock in another company. With this 
approach, the target company in the reorganization could be turned into a wholly owned 
subsidiary.    10
of disclosure required under Japan’s accounting standards had been considerably 
lower than that required under the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
and the European International Accounting Standards. Therefore, if a domestic or 
foreign firm was considering a merger or acquisition, there was the risk that the 
target firm’s financial statements would not accurately reflect the firm’s actual 
financial condition. Beginning in 1999, firms were required to disclose 
quasi-guarantee acts (which occur when the parent extends a guarantee to the 
creditor holding the debt of its subsidiary), and beginning in 2000, consolidated 
firms were required to adhere to an “actual control” standard. The disclosure of 
financial information was revised from a non-consolidated to a consolidated basis. 
Firms were required to use tax-effective accounting and disclose their 
consolidated cash flow. Market-value accounting was introduced for pension 
liabilities in 2001 and for holding companies in 2002. These reforms made it 
easier to grasp the financial condition of a target firm from publicly disclosed 
information prior to a merger or acquisition. (Hattori 2004, Chapter 2). 
Finally, the increase in mergers and acquisitions encouraged domestic and 
foreign investment banks to enter the M&A market. The creation of an 
infrastructure for M&A intermediation, due diligence, valuation, and other 
services played an important role. From the late 1990s, foreign financial 
institutions entered the M&A intermediation business. Japanese banks and 
securities houses followed suit by expanding their M&A departments. In a 
parallel development, big law firms began to treat M&A advising as one of their 
important services. The M&A infrastructure became irreversible, and accordingly 
the costs associated with M&A activity, including the search for potential 
acquisition targets, were reduced. 
These institutional changes were not completely exogenous to the increase in 
M&A. Firms that sought to reorganize and achieve growth through mergers and 
acquisitions pursued legal reforms, which in turn promoted M&A. But if that were 
indeed the case, why did firms seek legal changes that promoted M&A during this 
time? Because all Japanese firms benefited from institutional changes, the   11
changes alone do not sufficiently explain why M&A activity surged during this 
particular period and in certain industries. The next section notes that the M&A 
wave in the late 1990s was clustered in particular industries. Apart from 
institutional factors, the analysis that follows in the rest of this paper is also 
necessary to explain what happened. 
  
3. M&A Clustering in Specific Industries: A Feature of the M&A Boom in the 
1990s 
Along with the M&A deals executed by foreign firms, M&A deals conducted 
between domestic firms rapidly surged from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. In 
the first half of the 2000s, there was an average of 1,497 deals annually, up about 
6.4-fold from an average of 232 deals annually in the late 1980s. In the late 1980s, 
deals between domestic firms accounted for 44.6% of all deals. This number grew 
to 76.3% of all deals in the new millennium. One could say that since 1999, 
Japanese firms have been actively participating in an M&A boom targeting other 
domestic firms.   
Moreover, M&A in the late 1990s was concentrated in a limited number of 
industries. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the number of mergers between 
domestic listed firms, as well as the number of acquisitions valued at 200 million 
yen or higher involving at least one listed firm. Between 1991 and 2004, there 
were a total of 1,605 deals (The subtotals are provided for 29 industry categories, 
which were compiled from RECOF Data’s 33 categories.) Mergers between listed 
firms were most common in the wholesale, retail, financial, construction, 
information and telecommunications, chemicals, machinery, and electric 
machinery sectors. Acquisitions were mainly concentrated in the information and 
telecommunications, wholesale, retail, and services sectors.   
The above figures do not adjust for the distribution of listed corporations 
across industries. Therefore, we standardized the number of mergers and 
acquisitions by sector according to the number of listed corporations in each 
sector at the start of the period. We call this the M&A ratio. Traditional sectors   12
such as paper and pulp; glass, stone and clay; coal and oil; steel; etc. with high 
numbers of deals had a higher M&A ratio. In contrast, the electric and 
construction sectors had a relatively lower M&A ratio. The information and 
telecommunications, wholesale, retail, and services sectors had a higher 
occurrence rate, even when seen through the relative M&A ratio. In contrast, the 
electricity and gas, transportation and warehousing, real estate, etc. had a lower 
M&A occurrence ratio. 
== Table 2 about here== 
In order to determine when particular sectors experienced an M&A boom, we 
followed Harford (2005) and present our results for each sector in Table 2. Our 
calculations were based on the 120 months from 1995 to 2004 for each industry. 
Randomly, with a probability of 1/120 per month, we calculated a value for 24 
months with 1,000 simulations. Next, we then compared actual totals for 24 
months with the predicted value, and if the actual total exceeded the 95th 
percentile of the simulated figure, we coded it as an M&A boom. For example, of 
the 158 M&A deals in the retail sector, 65 deals occurred since February 2001. On 
the other hand, the maximum aggregate value for M&As exceeding the 95th 
percentile was 57. Therefore, we can conclude that the M&A boom in the retail 
sector began in February 2001.
11 
According to Table 3, M&A boom occurred in 13 sectors in the late 1990s. 
More specifically, the M&A boom between domestic firms began in 1998 in the 
coal and oil sector, and continued in 1999 in the nonferrous metals, financial, and 
insurance sectors. A surge in M&A began in the retail and electric machinery 
industries in 2001. Rapid technological innovation produced a similar spike in 
2003 in the information and telecommunications sector. Given this activity, the 
question remains: what accounts for the clustering of M&A in these particular 
industries? 
== Table 3 about here== 
                                                   
11 We wish to extend our gratitude to Kee Hong Bae for his cooperation in this 
estimation.    13
 
4. Why M&A has clustered 
4.1 Hypotheses 
Why did the surge in mergers and acquisitions concentrate in particular 
industries? The following factors have been cited by previous scholars as causes 
of rapid increases in M&A activity clustered in particular industries (followed by 
rapid declines).   
The first argument emphasizes real shock. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and 
Andrade and Stafford (2004) emphasize the role of industry-level economic 
shocks on the allocation of economic resources. Documenting the M&A clustering, 
Harford (2005) suggests that merger waves happen because of industry-wide 
economic shocks, which trigger the reallocation of the economic resources 
thorough M&A activity. In this case, economic shocks can be both positive and 
negative. 
Positive shocks include technological innovations that enable firms to reap 
economies of scale and scope, and deregulatory measures that make it easier for 
firms to enter sectors with high profitability. For example, technological 
innovations that primarily magnify economies of scale encourage horizontal 
M&As, while technological innovations that yield economies of scope bring about 
non-horizontal M&A including the fusion of telecommunications and finance. 
On the other hand, some studies emphasize the role of adverse shocks. 
Jensen (1993: 839) stresses that after the oil crisis American corporations faced a 
serious excess capacity problem due to the plunge in demand, rapid expansion of 
scale, and technological innovations that made much of the existing capital 
obsolete. “Takeover activities were addressing an important set of problems in 
corporate America, and doing it before the companies faced serious trouble in the 
product market.” 
Second, Harford (2005) explains that for M&A to occur in an economy as a 
whole, the financial constraints on parties to M&A need to be minimal. In other 
words, an increase in liquidity at the macro level eases financial constraints on   14
M&A activity and consequently leads to an overall increase in the number of 
M&A. 
Third, a stylized fact of M&A activity in the U.S. is an increase in the number 
of M&A transactions occurs during stock market booms. For example, Golbe and 
White (1988) report that there is a positive correlation between stock prices and 
M&A activity. When a stock market boom promotes an M&A boom, there are dual 
welfare effects. On one hand, assuming that the stock market is efficient and 
accurately assesses the high growth opportunity of a particular industry, the stock 
market boom reflects improvements in fundamentals, and resource allocation 
should be efficient. 
On the other hand, if the stock market for some reason overprices an industry 
above its fundamental value, there will be a major difference between the stock 
market boom’s welfare effect on the M&A boom. This perspective is called the 
market-driven hypothesis, and assumes that the stock market is characterized by 
inefficiency. While the 1980s M&A boom in the U.S. was characterized by 
leveraged buyouts and other deals that used cash as a means of payment, the M&A 
boom of the 1900s was characterized by an increase in the number of deals that 
were financed with stock. Focusing on this feature, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
advanced a theory that when managers possess information that the market’s 
valuation is higher than a firm’s fundamental value, they have an incentive to 
reap profits through M&A deals that involve the swap of their own company stock. 
Myopic managers of target firms will ignore the expected long-term profits and 
have an incentive to sell their own firm in response to a favorable offer from the 
acquiring firm.
12 In that case, the acquisition will generate losses for the 
                                                   
12 Furthermore, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) theoretically demonstrate that 
firms in which stock prices are overvalued by the market have an incentive to carry out 
M&A through stock swaps. Their model assumes that the managers of the buying firm 
have complete information regarding the value of their own firm, while the managers of 
the target firm cannot accurately calculate the future synergies to be reaped from M&A. 
When the stock market is booming, managers of a target firm who do not have complete 
information based on excessive expectations of future synergies, will accept offers for 
a buyout paid for with the overpriced stock of the buying firm.     15
stockholders of the target firm. Next, we investigate these different explanations 
about M&A activity at the industry level using industry-level data. 
 
4.2. Data 
Following the hypotheses discussed above, we begin to analyze the 
determinants of Japanese M&A in the 1990s using industry-level data.   
The database originates from RECOF’s M&A database of Japanese 
companies. We exclude the financial sector from our sample because this sector 
faces different regulations. Our measure of the frequency of M&A activity in each 
sector is the M&A ratio. The ratio is calculated based on the M&A deals by firms 
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) 1
st or 2
nd section with a transaction 
value of at least 200 million yen from 1991 to 2004.
13 Consequently,  we  exclude 
deals by the firms listed on Mothers, JASDAQ, Hercules, and those by non-listed 
firms. Furthermore, we exclude the deals within the same group firm and the deals 
that result in the shareholdings by acquire less than 50%. We assign bidders and 
target firms to one of the industry sectors based on the Industry code made by 
TSE.
14  
The independent variables are constructed based on the following process 
using financial data from AMSUS, NEEDS, and the Toyo Keizai financial 
database. 
First, to examine the effect of fundamental factors on M&A, we control for 
the industry’s growth opportunities and profitability. As a proxy for growth 
opportunities, we use Tobin’s q. Under the neoclassical hypothesis, the number of 
M&A deals will increase in a particular industry when the productivity of that 
industry as a whole increases (or decreases) because of technological innovation, 
demand expansion (reduction), or a dramatic change in competitiveness due to 
deregulations.  
Second, as a proxy for profitability, we use the return on assets (ROA) and the 
                                                   
13  20 million yen is the first quartile of the amount of money for deals.   
14  We corrected some codes based on the TSE industry code.   16
first principal component (PROF) where five variables (the ratio of cash flow to 
sales, the ratio of sales to total asset, employee growth, sales growth) are applied. 
We predict that the probability of M&A is higher when these variables are larger 
(or lower). 
Following Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Andrade and Stafford (2004), we 
also include the lagged sales growth and the deviation of sales growth from its 
five-year mean (Econshock) to capture industry shocks. The industry shock is one 
of the determinants of the merger wave if the M&A ratio is negatively related 
with this shock. Since the Econshock only captures shocks on the demand side, we 
also add the standard deviation of the median three-year stock return(σ(ER)) to 
capture the much broader shocks to the industry. We assume that more highly 
volatile stock returns reflect negative shocks that the industry faced over the 
previous three years.   
To control the effect of capital liquidity, we add the one-year change of the 
base money in money supply.
15 We expect a positive relationship between the 
percentage change of base money and the probability of M&A in the case where 
higher capital liquidity in the macro economy makes financial constraints less 
severe.  
Finally, to examine the validity of the effect of overvaluation in the stock 
market on M&A, we follow Harford (2005) and add the average three-year stock 
return (ER). We expect a positive relationship between ER and the probability of 
M&A if the overvaluation encourages M&A activity. The values of all the 




4.3.  Descriptive Statistics 
                                                   
15  Harford (2005) uses the spread, which is the difference between the loan rate and a 
risk free asset, as the proxy for the macro economic liquidity. Considering that BOJ 
took the zero-interest rate policy from the end of 1990s, we use the base money instead 
of using the spread. 
16  Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) use the median of each profitability index.   17
Table 4 lists the descriptive statistics for the average M&A ratio, growth 
opportunity, profitability, ratio of physical investment to total asset, percentage 
changes of total factor productivity (TFP), level and percentage changes of 
regulation index, and correlation between the M&A ratio and other variables.
 
Here, the regulation index shows the extent to which each industry faced 
regulation. A high number implies greater regulation. This variable serves as a 
proxy for industry shocks like TFP.
17  
Table 4, does not suggest a clear relationship between the M&A ratio and the 
growth opportunity or profitability. While q is larger in the sectors with higher 
M&A ratios, like IT, service, and retail, it is also above average for the sectors 
with lower M&A ratios like medical, machinery, electronics. We find a similar 
tendency for ROA. In fact, the correlation between the M&A ratio, Tobin’s q, and 
ROA are relatively low.   
Second, we find a negative relationship between the M&A ratio and the 
investment ratio. This suggests that these variables are substitutes, a result that is 
consistent with Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002). 
Finally, the correlation coefficient on the bottom indicates a negative 
relationship between the percentage change in regulation and the M&A ratio. In 
contrast, the percentage change in TFP is positively related to M&A. These 
observations are consistent with the neoclassical view that fundamental economic 
shocks drive merger waves. 
＝＝Table 4  about here  ＝＝ 
Table 5 lists the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for each variable 
we use in a later regression. Note that each variable lagged one year to the M&A 
ratio. The correlation between Tobin’s q and ER is smaller than expected at 0.20, 
while the correlation between Tobin’s q and ROA is 0.48. The correlation between 
base money as a proxy for capital liquidity and Tobin’s q is -0.177. This result 
                                                   
17  TFP and the regulation index are based on the Japan Industry Productivity Database 
(JIP Database 2006). The original JIP database has 108 industries. We reorganized them 
into 29 industries weighted by sales volume. Because of data aggregation, these 
numbers will not be as precise as other variables.     18
suggests that M&A activity does not increase with a higher Tobin’s q during 
periods with larger capital liquidity. 
＝＝Table 5  about here  ＝＝ 
 
4.4 Industry Level Analysis   
In this section, we examine the determinants of M&A ratio and focus on 
positive and negative fundamental shocks, as well as stock price returns.
18 Since 
the dependent variable is censored, we mode the M&A ratio using a tobit 
specification.   
＝＝Table 6  about here  ＝＝ 
As in shown in Table 6 model (1), the coefficient on Tobin’s q as a proxy for 
growth opportunity is significantly positive at the 1% level. This evidence 
suggests that M&A occur in industries with relatively higher growth 
opportunities. 
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that M&A activity is driven by 
the overvaluation of the bidding firm’s stock price. In model  (1),  we  include 
the three-year stock price return (ER) in the regression to test directly the market 
driven hypothesis following Harford (2005). Since the coefficient of ER is 
negative and less significant, we have no reason to think that the overvaluation of 
stock prices is the driver of M&A activity in that sector. Using pooled data 
instead of panel data (model 3) or adding a one-year lag of the M&A ratio (not 
shown) produces similar results.
19 These results imply that sectors with higher 
growth opportunities on average are likely to see more M&A, while we cannot 
find any clear evidence of an effect of stock price overvaluation. The proportion 
of stock swap deals to total M&A in Japan was very low (only 4% in 2006), and it 
was heavily used by firms listed on emerging markets like Mothers. Consequently, 
the market-driven hypothesis does not seem appropriate for explaining M&A 
                                                   
18  We could not find any significant result for TFP and the index of regulations. 
19 The coefficient on the one-year lag of the M&A ratio is positive, while the 
coefficient on the one-year stock return is positive but insignificant.   19
activity among larger, established firms. 
Next, we address the effect of profitability on industry-level M&A. As a 
proxy for profitability, we use PROF and ROA. The estimation results show that 
the coefficient on PROF is positive but insignificant (model 1, 3). When we use 
ROA instead of PROF, the coefficient is again negative and insignificant (model 
2). Unlike the studies examining M&A in the U.S. in the 1990s, we cannot find a 
positive relationship between the M&A ratio and profitability in Japan. These 
results suggest that M&A activity in Japan occurs more heavily in sectors that had 
a positive industry shock in terms of growth opportunity. 
The coefficient of Econshock, which is the deviation of current sales growth 
from the previous five-year average, is significantly negative at the 5% level 
(model 1). We find similar results when we use ROA instead of PROF (model 2), 
or change the estimation method from panel to pooled (model 3). The rapid 
increase of M&A in Japan from the late 1990s is motivated by the remarkable 
decline of sales.   
Further, the coefficient on σ (ER), the proxy for exogenous shocks to each 
industry, is significantly negative. For example, based on model (1), a one 
standard deviation increases in σ (ER), or 2.125, raises the M&A ratio about 3.2%, 
which is almost the same magnitude as the 3.2% of M&A ratio. 
Considering that the Japanese economy gradually recovered from 2003, we 
estimate the regression using years up to 2002 (model 4). In this limited 
estimation period, we find the coefficient of Econshock and σ (ER) highly 
significant. If stock price volatility reflects negative industry shocks, we can 
conclude that the merger boom in Japan was due to both positive and negative 
industry shocks.   
Finally, the coefficient on base money, the proxy for capital liquidity, is 
always insignificant.
20 On average, capital liquidity as a whole is not a good 
                                                   
20 We also include the spread, the average bank loan interest minus JGB yield, 
following Harford (2005). The spread is also insignificant.     20
proxy for explaining the M&A boom in the 1990s at the industry level.
21 
In summary, the above results suggest that the rapid increase of M&A activity 
is due to a change in growth opportunities and decreasing sales. These 
conclusions are consistent with Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade and 
Stafford (2004), and Harford (2005). After his case study of M&A in U.S., Kaplan 
(2000) suggests that most of the M&A resulted from technological shocks, 
deregulation, a change in growth opportunities, and a change in profitability. The 
results of this section show that positive and negative changes to growth 
opportunities and the decreasing sales due to industrial shocks triggered the 
merger boom in Japan. Contrary to the U.S. case, however, stock price     
overvaluation for bidding firms and macro-level capital liquidity do not affect the 
M&A boom in Japan substantially. We cannot find any evidence that supports the 
market-driven hypothesis among large listed firms. 
 
5.  A Firm-Level Investigation of M&A   
5.1.  Hypothesis 
In this section, we investigate the relative characteristics of acquiring and 
target firms at the firm level. We focus on whether M&A activity of acquiring and 
target firms is explained by their growth opportunity, even though other factors 
such as size or competition level are likely to matter. Jovanovic and Rousseau 
(2002) shows that M&A decisions can be explained by q theory, as in the case of 
internal investments.
22  That is, firms with a higher Tobin’s q are likely to be the 
acquiring firms. Since M&A is regarded as an effective tool for corporate 
restructuring, firms with a lower q are likely to be targets of M&A. M&A between 
high q acquiring firms and low q target firms is likely to create value. 
For the financial aspects, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) suggest the following 
theory concerning the relationship between a firm’s financial constraint and M&A. 
                                                   
21  We investigate the effect of financial constraints on M&A activity on the firm level 
in a later discussion. 
22  Andrade and Stafford (2004) emphasize the degree of substitutability between M&A 
and physical investments.     21
Suppose a firm’s cash flow increases mainly because of an improvement in the 
fundamentals factor. This increase relaxes financing constraints for the bidding 
firm, which tends to offer the target firm a price that more closely resembles its 
fundamental value. Testing this reasoning, we examine whether the firms with 
less severe financial constraint are likely to engage in M&A activity or not. 
For target firms, we test whether more highly leveraged firms tend to be 
targets of M&A as the result of the manager’s fear of defaulting, as Jensen (1993) 
emphasized. We also investigate the effect of cross-shareholdings on M&A. 
Opposite to the predicted direction of the effect of leverage, managers of firms 
with higher cross-shareholdings might face less pressure for the restructuring, 
and therefore be more likely to avoid accepting an offer for acquisition.   
 
5.2.  Data 
We begin by examining differences in characteristics between acquiring firms, 
target firms, and non-M&A firms. All the M&A deals are related to firms listed 
on the TSE 1
st or 2
nd section. That is, M&A are composed of 1) mergers between 
listed firms, and 2) acquisitions where either the bidder or the target is a listed 
firm. We include acquiring firms in deals valued at 200 million yen or higher in 
the analysis. On the other hand, we include all targeted firms that are listed. Note 
that listed firms are more likely to be acquiring firms than targeted firms. The 
sample period is 1995 to 2004 for the analysis of bidding firms and 2000 to 2004 
for the analysis of target firms. Firms are classified as engaging in M&A in the 
year in which they did the M&A activity. In other years, the firm is classified as a 
non-M&A firm unless it took additional M&A activity.
23 When mergers occur, 
we identify the bidder and the target according to the definition in RECOF. The 
financial characteristics of the sample firms are shown in Table 7. 
＝＝Table 7  about here  ＝＝ 
Table 7 shows that the size of acquiring firms is larger than that of non-M&A 
                                                   
23  The M&A indicator takes the value of 1 for firms that undertake multiple M&A in 
one year.     22
firms. The size of target firms is significantly small. Tobin’s q is higher for 
acquiring firms than target firms. This is consistent with the result in the former 
section that higher growth opportunity triggers M&A activity. Similarly, the ROA 
of acquiring firms is significantly higher than that of targeted and non-M&A 
firms. Leverage for acquiring firms is significantly lower than that of target firms. 
Risk, as measured by the 36-month volatility of stock returns, is significantly 
higher for target firms. This is consistent with the view that higher risk firms are 
more likely to be the target in M&A. Finally, we do not find any significant 
differences for net debt, which is the ratio of liquidity assets minus debt to total 
assets. 
 
5.3. Firm Level Analysis I: Acquisitions 
In this section, we model the choice to acquire firm by using a logit 
specification. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a firm engages in 
M&A activity as an acquiring firm, and zero otherwise. Under this definition, 4% 
of all cases are M&A.
24 
The independent variables are similar to Section 4, except that they vary at 
the firm level rather than the industry level. We use Tobin’s q as a proxy for 
growth opportunity again. We expect a positive relationship between M&A 
activity and growth opportunity.
25 To investigate the relationship between 
growth opportunity and M&A more clearly, we also include two dummy variables 
as additional proxies for growth opportunity. The first is Hq, which equals one if 
a firm’s Tobin’s q is among top quintile. The second is Lq, which equals one if 
the firm’s Tobin’s q is among the bottom quintile of the total distribution. We 
also include real sales growth for the same purpose. 
To examine the effect of financial constraints, we include the net debt (Ndebt), 
which is defined as the ratio of total cash equivalents minus debt to total assets. 
                                                   
24  The number of sample firms in which the dummy variable equals 1 is 491. 
25  Since we could not find any evidences in support of the market driven hypothesis in 
the previous section, q serves as a proxy for growth opportunity only.   23
Because business portfolio diversification is a motivation for buying other firms, 
we include the 3-year standard deviation of stock returns (Risk) as a proxy for 
risk.
26  Further, to control for the degree of substitutability between firm or asset 
purchases and internal investment, we use investment (Investment). Finally, we 
add industrial level and year fixed effects.   
Table 8 reveals that size is clearly an important determinant of acquisitions. 
The coefficient of q is insignificant and the sign is unstable.   
＝＝Table 8  about here  ＝＝ 
Specifications (2), (3), and (4) include the Hq dummy and the Lq dummy. The 
coefficient on Hq is significantly positive while the coefficient on Lq is negative 
and significant in some specifications. This shows that firms with a higher q are 
more likely to attempt takeover bids. We can conclude that the probability of 
making a takeover bid for a firm is higher for firms with larger growth 
opportunities. 
Ndebt is positive and significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the 
coefficient is almost similar to that of Hq and size. This suggests that the firms 




5.3. Firm Level Analysis II: Targeting 
   
We now turn to an examination of the behavior of target firms. The dependent 
variable is an indicator that equals one if a firm is the target of an M&A deal and 
zero otherwise.
28  The independent variables are similar to Section 5.2. 
                                                   
26  M&As that are driven by the desire to diversify business portfolios tend to decrease 
shareholder value.   
27  This result does not contradict the conclusion that matured firms are more likely to 
engage in M&A. Blanchard et al. (1994) showed that the performance of M&A by firms 
with excess internal funds tends to be lower. 
28 Most of the deals we use in the sample are between listed bidding firms and 
non-listed target firms. The analysis of target firms is relatively limited as a result. In 
fact, the dependent variable takes the value one only 1% (88 cases) of the time.   24
To proxy for restructuring incentives, we use the ratio of debt to total assets 
(DA). We also add the ratio of cross-shareholding to total issued shares as a proxy 
for weak corporate governance because cross-shareholdings may reduce 
shareholder pressure to restructure (Cross). As in the case of acquiring firms, we 
add the log of assets to control for firm size (Size), and the three-year standard 
deviation of the stock return to control for risk (Risk). Year and industry-level 
fixed effects are also included.   
＝＝Table 9  about here  ＝＝ 
Table 9 illustrates that the coefficient on Lq is significantly positive, 
suggesting that the firms with a lower Tobin’s q are more likely to be targeted for 
M&A. The growth rate of sales is negative and significant in (1). This indicates 
that firms facing stagnating sales are also likely to be targeted for M&A. The fact 
that both mature firms and ones with slower sales growth are more likely to be 
targeted suggests that M&A is used as a means of corporate restructuring. 
Although Risk is not significant, the coefficient on the ratio of debt to total 
assets, DA, is significantly positive. The more highly leveraged firm stands a 
greater risk of being targeted for M&A. This result is consistent with the standard 
understanding that higher leverage is a driver of M&A targeting because of the 
higher default risk.
29   Finally, we cannot find any evidence that 




In this paper, we examine the causes of the merger boom that has occurred in 
Japan since the late 1990s. We find that mergers and acquisitions are mainly 
driven by economic shocks. While industries with higher growth opportunity are 
likely to engage in more M&A activity, the same is also true for industries facing 
negative fundamental shocks like sales declines. These results imply that the 
                                                   
29  The Japanese banking sector accelerated the bad-loan cleanup in this period, and this 
might influence this result.   25
neoclassical model can explain the recent merger wave in Japan. 
While these results are consistent with findings based on U.S. data by 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade and Stafford (2004), and Harford (2005), 
it is remarkable that the merger boom is driven by both positive and negative 
shocks in Japan. In the U.S., the merger wave in the 1980s was mainly driven by 
negative economic shocks. In contrast, the wave in the 1990s was mainly driven 
by positive economic shocks like technological innovation. Capital liquidity at 
the macro level, as well as the stock market boom, have not had positive effects 
on merger activity in Japan, as they have in the U.S. and other countries (Jackson 
and Miyajima, 2007). Overall, the view supported here is that the merger activity 
that resulted from economic shocks was itself driven by the need to reallocate 
assets among industries.   
At the firm level, we find that bidders are generally growing firms and 
targeted firms tend to be more mature. This suggests that Japanese firms 
improved their efficiency through merger activity in the 1990s. Furthermore, we 
find that internal funds for acquiring firms play a very important role in bidding 
activity. This suggests that it is much easier for a firm with less severe financial 
constraints to succeed in M&A. This is consistent with the fact that M&A activity 
increased rapidly during the beginning of the 21
st century, a time when large 
Japanese firms started large-scale reductions in their leverage. Finally, we 
conclude that firms with more leverage are more likely to be targeted for M&A 
because the increased default risk applies pressure on the manager to entertain 
M&A offers. 
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 Source:　 RECOF,  M&A Data Book in Japan , 1988-2004. RECOF, MARR M&A data, CD-ROM edition.
Note: IN-IN: Ｍ＆Ａ between domestic firms, IN-OUT: M&A of Japanese firms to foreign firms,
OUT-IN: M&A of Foreign firms to Japanese firms 








1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
IN-IN IN-OUT










Total M&A Intra-group Holding company Foreign company
1999 40 1 0 1 4 ----
2000 1 00 2 1 3 1 ----
2001 8 1 18 27 29 68 9 0
2002 7 1 29 37 37 93 15 0
2003 7 2 13 22 31 86 14 1
2004 8 2 69 79 57 85 25 1
2005 9 3 68 80 54 97 41 3
Total 53 9 228 290 208 429 104 5
Source: MARR, RECOF
Stock transfer and swap system Company divestiture system
Each number in the table indicates the number of the deals using each newly introduced measure. The number of spin-off deals is excluded.








Mining 10 0.5% 0 0 9.05%
Grocery 67 3.6% 5 2.9% 4.49%
Fabric 34 1.8% 3 1.7% 4.02%
Pulp and paper 19 1.0% 6 3.4% 8.93%
Rubber products 5 0.3% 2 1.1% 2.58%
Ceramic industry 25 1.3% 7 4.0% 4.49%
Chemistry 76 4.1% 10 5.7% 3.41%
Medical drag 20 1.1% 3 1.7% 3.08%
Coal and oil 10 0.5% 3 1.7% 6.90%
Iron and steel 12 0.6% 4 2.3% 2.94%
Nonferrous metal 53 2.8% 6 3.4% 3.78%
Machinery 77 4.1% 11 6.3% 3.04%
Transport equipment 50 2.7% 7 4.0% 4.44%
Electric equipment  82 4.4% 10 5.7% 2.40%
Precision mechanical equipment 18 1.0% 2 1.1% 2.13%
Other manufacture 65 3.5% 2 1.1% 6.99%
Electric power and gas 10 0.5% 0 0.0% 2.74%
Real estate 30 1.6% 0 0.0% 2.95%
Construction 76 4.1% 14 8.0% 3.68%
Transportation and storage 36 1.9% 8 4.6% 2.96%
Information and communication 276 14.8% 13 7.4% 5.46%
Wholesale 220 11.8% 19 10.9% 6.98%
Retail 158 8.5% 7 4.0% 5.16%
Banking 48 2.6% 15 8.6% -
Insurance carriers 19 1.0% 5 2.9% -
Security brokers and dealers 25 1.3% 6 3.4% -
Other financial services 84 4.5% 1 0.6% -
Service 260 13.9% 6 3.4% 10.87%
Manufacturing sector 623 33.4% 81 46.3% -
Nonmanufacturing sector 1242 66.6% 94 53.7% -
Total 1865 100.0% 175 100.0% 4.74%
Source: RECOF
The number of M&A deals is based on publicly disclosed information excluding unrealized
deals. The numbers represent the number of mergers between domestic listed firms, and















1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Agriculture 1 1 2 200112
Mining 10 8 10 200110
Grocery 67 24 30 200101
Fabric 34 17 18 200204
Pulp and paper 19 8 14 199805
Rubber products 5 3 5 200103
Ceramic industry 25 10 15 200203
Chemistry 76 31 31 200204
Medical drag 20 9 11 200204
Coal and oil 10 9 9 199803
Iron and steel 12 7 9 200009
Nonferrous metal 53 25 25 199907
Machinery 77 29 30 200301
Transport equipment 50 26 25 200208
Electric equipment  82 32 32 200111
Precision mechanical equipment 18 8 11 200201
Other manufacture 65 27 26 200104
Electric power and gas 10 8 9 200108
Real estate 30 17 19 200205
Construction 76 28 32 200112
Transportation and storage 36 13 19 200301
Information and communication 276 143 110 200301
Wholesale 220 84 76 200207
Retail 158 65 57 200102
Banking 48 27 25 199908
Insurance carriers 19 17 14 199909
Security brokers and dealers 25 14 14 200208
Other financial services 84 40 34 200301
Service 260 110 89 200212
Source: RECOF
The numbers represent the number of mergers between domestic listed firms, and acquisitions valued at 200 million yen or higher that involved at least one
listed firm.
              represents the M&A boom. We identified the M&A boom when the actual number of M&A deals in a 24 month period exceeds over 95% of the
number estimated by simulation for the estimation period (1995-2004).
              represents the period with the largest number of M&A deals in 24 months in the industry.Table 4: M&A ratio and performance variables
 















Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 1.19% 1.397 1.34% -0.28% 2.3% 0.635 -0.069 -0.158
Mining 9.05% 1.122 1.32% 1.60% 2.9% 0.558 -0.055 -0.005
Grocery 4.49% 1.181 1.84% 0.84% 3.7% 0.733 -0.041 0.002
Fabric 4.02% 1.082 0.97% -2.67% 2.1% 0.001 -0.004 -0.015
Pulp and paper 8.93% 1.076 0.97% -0.98% 3.9% 0.000 0.000 -0.006
Rubber products 2.58% 1.162 1.97% -0.48% 4.4% 0.623 0.034 -0.003
Ceramic industry 4.49% 1.111 0.98% -0.77% 3.0% 0.065 0.020 0.001
Chemistry 3.41% 1.121 1.50% -0.31% 3.6% 0.154 0.009 -0.004
Medical drag 3.08% 1.410 2.84% 1.70% 2.5% 1.000 0.000 0.025
Coal and oil 6.90% 1.167 1.07% 0.45% 2.7% 0.438 -0.094 0.002
Iron and steel 2.94% 1.052 0.62% -1.32% 3.5% 0.000 0.000 0.007
Nonferrous metal 3.78% 1.093 1.20% -1.14% 2.8% 0.054 -0.001 -0.010
Machinery 3.04% 1.184 1.34% 0.02% 2.1% 0.093 -0.028 -0.019
Transport equipment 4.44% 1.080 1.35% 0.18% 4.9% 0.282 0.015 0.006
Electric equipment  2.40% 1.240 1.31% 0.23% 2.6% 0.299 -0.038 0.025
Precision mechanical equipment 2.13% 1.216 1.45% 0.21% 2.5% 0.577 0.077 -0.015
Other manufacture 6.99% 1.136 1.94% 0.42% 2.6% 0.156 -0.014 0.005
Electric power and gas 2.74% 1.107 1.31% 1.35% 10.2% 1.000 0.000 -0.002
Real estate 2.95% 1.093 1.65% 2.55% 2.2% 0.286 0.057 -0.006
Construction 3.68% 1.045 1.05% -0.61% 1.1% 0.537 0.088 -0.012
Transportation and storage 2.96% 1.202 1.10% 0.92% 4.9% 0.942 0.013 -0.007
Information and communication 5.46% 1.598 2.27% 1.06% 2.3% 0.047 -0.026 0.023
Wholesale 6.98% 1.053 1.30% 0.35% 0.8% 0.000 0.000 0.023
Retail 5.16% 1.208 2.27% 3.90% 5.3% 0.000 0.000 0.006
Service 10.87% 1.327 2.45% 2.95% 3.1% 0.526 0.009 -0.009
All industries 4.74% 1.166 1.45% 0.50% 3.2% 0.360 -0.002 -0.006
Correlation with M&A ratio - 0.065 0.152 0.260 -0.162 -0.234 -0.236 0.276
Source: MARR, RECOF
The sample consists of companies listed on the 1st and 2nd sections of the TSE from 1991 to 2004. We use the RIETI JIP2006 index for
constructing TFP and the regulation index. Since the JIP2006 index is available up to 2002, we assume the index is the same from 2002 to
2004. Changes in regulation and TFP represent the mean yearly change during the sample period.Panel A: Mean
N Mean Std dev
M&A ratio 351 0.032 0.100
Tobin's q 351 1.188 0.266
ER 351 0.064 0.951
σ（ER) 351 10.586 2.125
ROA 351 0.015 0.008
PROF 351 -0.162 0.962
Econshock 351 -0.025 0.049
Base money 352 0.081 0.076
Panel B: Correlation Matrix
　 M&A ratio Tobin's q ER σ（ER) ROA PROF Econshock Base Money
M&A ratio 1
Tobin's q 0.275 1
ER -0.093 0.198 1
σ（ER) 0.129 0.077 -0.072 1
ROA 0.042 0.480 0.366 -0.033 1
PROF 0.138 0.362 -0.112 -0.038 0.420 1
Econshock -0.103 0.119 0.410 -0.155 0.310 -0.076 1
Base Money -0.177 -0.288 0.072 0.017 -0.209 -0.238 -0.219 1
 
Table 5:  Descriptive statistics and correlation
The number of M&A deals is based on publicly disclosed information excluding unrealized deals. The numbers
represent the number of mergers between domestic listed firms, and acquisitions valued at 200 million yen or
higher that involved at least one listed firm. ER represents the 36-month average stock return. σ(ER) represents the
standard deviation of ER. ROA represents the operating income on assets. PROF represents the first principle
component estimated by principle component analysis on ROA, the cashflow/sales ratio, the growth rate of the
number of employees, and sales growth. Econshock is the deviation of sales growth from its previous five-years
average. Basemoney is the yeary change in base money at money supply.Table 6: Estimating the frequency of M&A deals by industry
Model 12 34
Tobit(PANEL) Tobit(PANEL) Tobit Tobit(PANEL)
q 0.190 *** 0.203 *** 0.176 *** 0.263 ***
4.740 5.000 3.870 5.810
ER -0.023  -0.024 * -0.022 　 -0.052 **
-1.630 -1.690 -1.470 -2.880
σ(ER) 0.015 *** 0.015 ** 0.011 * 0.020 ***
2.750 2.810 1.760 3.250
ROA -0.063  
-0.040
PROF 0.011    0.022 　 0.013
0.910     1.470 1.020
Econshock -0.501 ** -0.475 ** -0.495 ** -0.429 *
-2.200 -2.050 -1.950 -1.740
Base money -0.032   -0.025 -0.067   0.063
  -0.220 -0.170 -0.440 0.380
C -0.461 *** -0.479 *** -0.407 *** -0.628 ***
-5.710 -6.080 -3.510 -6.520
Ind Dummy No No Yes No
Year Dummy No No Yes No
Log Likelihood -25.082 -25.498 -4.769 -31.074
N 349 347 349  303
The sample consists of companies listed on the 1st and 2nd sections of the TSE, from 1991 to
2004. The sample is from 1991 to 2002 in Model 4. ER represents the 36-month average stock
return. σ(ER) represents the standard deviation of ER. ROA represents the operating income on
assets. PROF represents the first principle component estimated by principle component analysis
on ROA, the cashflow/sales ratio, the growth rate of the number of employees, and sales growth.
Econshock is the deviation of sales growth from its previous five-years average. Basemoney is
the yeary change in base money at money supply. Coefficients and standard deviations are listed.





 Target  company  
Total asset 11.104 11.956 *** 10.799 *
Tobin's q 1.219 1.395 *** 1.303
INV (Capital spending / total asse 11.715 0.045 -0.072 ***
DA (Debt / total asset) 0.552 0.509 *** 0.598
sales growth 0.036 0.051 *** -0.038 **
Net debt -0.373 -0.367 -0.353
ROA 0.007 0.020 *** -0.001
Risk 11.730 11.532 13.779 ***
Net debt is defined as [total cash equivalent - debt] / total asset. Risk represents the standard
deviation of a 36-month average stock return. We employ the Wilcoxon test for comparing M&A
and Non-M&A firms. ***, **, * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.Table 8: Estimation results for acquiring firms
Model 1 2 3 4
q 0.000  -0.001   -0.001 -0.001
0.001  0.001   0.001 0.001
      
Lq        -0.005 ** -0.004
       0.002 0.002
      
Hq    0.007 ** 0.006 *
   0.003   0.003
      
sales growth 0.001  -0.001   0.000 -0.001
0.006  0.006   0.006 0.006
      
Ndebt 0.008 ** 0.007 * 0.009 *** 0.008 **
0.004  0.004   0.004 0.001
      
Size 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 ***
0.001  0.001   0.001 0.004
      
Risk 0.000  0.000   0.000 0.000
0.000  0.000   0.000 0.000
      
Investment -0.001  -0.001   -0.001 -0.001
0.003  0.003   0.003 0.003
y96 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003
0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005
y97 0.013 0.010 0.014 0.011
0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008
y98 0.010 0.007 0.011 0.008
0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007
y99 0.024 ** 0.019 ** 0.026 ** 0.021 **
0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010
y00 0.015 * 0.012 0.017 * 0.014
0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009
y01 0.033 ** 0.028 ** 0.036 ** 0.030 **
0.013 0.012 0.014 0.013
y02 0.039 ** 0.032 ** 0.042 *** 0.034 **
0.015 0.014 0.016 0.015
y03 0.044 *** 0.036 ** 0.046 *** 0.039
0.017 0.015 0.018 0.016
y04 0.086 *** 0.077 *** 0.091 *** 0.082 ***
0.026 0.024 0.027 0.026
Ind Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.131 0.133 0.132 0.134
Log Likelihood -1232.129 -1228.817   -1230.1 -1227.745
Positive Observation 491 491 491 491
N 11,589 11,589 11,589 11,589
The sample consists of companies listed on the 1st and 2nd sections of the TSE.. The sample
period covers 1995 to 2004. Lq  is a dummy variable that equals one if Tobin's q of the sample
firm is among the bottom quintile of the total distribution. Hq is a dummy variable that equals
one if Tobin's q of the sample firm is among top quintile. Ndebt is defined as [total cash
equivalent - debt] / total asset. Size is the log of total asset. Risk is the 3-year standard deviation
of stock return.  Investment is the ratio of physical investment to fixed assets. Marginal effects
and standard deviations are listed. ***, **, * denote significant differences from zero at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. We use a Logit model for the estimation specification.Table 9: Estimation results for target firms
Model 123 4
q 0.001 0.001   0.001 0.001
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
  
Lq 0.004 * 0.004 * 0.004 *
0.002 0.002 0.002
  
Hq -0.001   0.000   0.000
0.002  0.002 0.002
  
sales growth -0.008 * -0.007 　 -0.007 　 -0.007
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
  
DA 0.009 *** 0.010 *** 0.010 *** 0.010 ***
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
  
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
      
Risk 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cross 0.000
0.000
y01 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
y02 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
y03 0.012 * 0.013 ** 0.013 ** 0.013 **
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
y04 0.010 * 0.011 * 0.011 * 0.011 *
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Ind Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.0769 0.083 0.083 0.0822
Log Likelihood -355.46881 -353.322 -353.320 -353.18445
Positive Observation 88 88 88 88
N 7760 7760   7760 7726
The sample consists of companies listed on the 1st and 2nd sections of the TSE.. The estimation period
covers 2000 to 2004. Lq  is a dummy variable that equals one if Tobin's q of the sample firm is among the
bottom quintile of total distribution. Hq is a dummy variable that equals one if Tobin's q of the sample firm
is among top quintile. Sales growth is the percentage change in sales from previous year. DA is the debt-
asset ratio. Size is the log of total assets. Risk is the 3-year standard deviation of stock returns. Cross is the
percentage share of cross-shareholdings. Marginal effects and standard deviations are listed. ***, **, *
denote significant differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels , respectively. We use a Logit model
for the estimation specification.